Presuppositions and conditions of constructing the fact in social sciences
The paper examines the nature of the social fact in social knowledge on the background of the differences between sciences and social sciences. The applied approach is historical (E. Durkheim, M. Weber, M. Mauss, J. Searle), as well as one based on differentiation between Humean conception of fact and the conceptions, in which facts are seen as determining the truth values of our propositions. Intentionality and the structure of social facts in terms of Searle's construction of the social are underlined as well as the weakness of his conception. In conclusion it is asserted that the construction of facts in social sciences is impossible without psychological vocabulary and concepts, which contents are conceived - contrary to Searle's internalism - in terms of externalism.
Tatiana Sedova, Filozoficky ustav SAV, Klemensova 19, 813 64 Bratislava 1, Slovak Republic; www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/filozofia
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