PL EN


Journal
2007 | 40 | 93-114
Article title

GRATITUDE AS A SOURCE OF MORAL OBLIGATIONS

Authors
Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
Three are three dominant ways in which the relation of gratitude is described in moral philosophy - as a debt, as an appropriate emotion or as a virtue. Although the debt theory is coherent and clear, it must be complemented with a psychological account of the relation between the giver and the recipient of a favor. A virtue based account of gratitude in turn moves the limits of what is morally significant too far. The conditions under which one is obliged to express gratitude comprise both motives of the giver and the recipient and the circumstances in which the favor was done. Egoistic motivation, coercion or lack of intentionality in the initial act of favor make it impossible to talk about the recipient's obligations. One should also exercise caution in the use of the idea of claim or right to gratitude.
Keywords
EN
Contributors
author
  • F. Niemczyk, Szkola Nauk Spolecznych, Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, ul. Nowy Swiat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
08PLAAAA04428562
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.02ecc50b-8bfe-3ad4-8e94-e52fb76dc20f
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