PL EN


2007 | 40 | 30-58
Article title

THE COGNITIVE STATUS OF THEORY: F. BONSACK'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM

Authors
Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
This paper puts forward mainly F. Bonsack's and Gonseth's conception of epistemological realism. In their opinion theory is characterized by schematic correspondence with the reality. It regards actually lasting controversy between the realists and unrealists and conditions of cognitive world view. The cognitive objectivism may increase through exploring and elimination subjective's determinants. It considers the criterion of physics reality object of cognition which was set up by F. Bonsack. This criterion is connected with invariable cognitive contents. In this article this criterion and its hypothetic character are shown.
Contributors
author
  • J. Kaczmarek, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, Katedra Filozofii Przyrody Nieozywionej, al. Raclawickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
07PLAAAA02855809
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.043cd189-3458-3e7f-aa9c-82563a982093
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