PL EN


2007 | 16 | 1(61) | 281-290
Article title

Actions as a Context for Realization of Meaning

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
The article shows how 'early' Heidegger approached the problem of intentionality. It begins with a reconstruction of Husserlian concept of intentionality understood as a perceptive act in which the object of experience is first constituted. The author shows subsequently that the Heideggerian understanding of intentionality does not apply to objects of perception but to meaning which can be 'grasped' in the practical attitude only. This attitude determines the pre-theoretical context of intentionality. In consequence, an overcoming of Husserl's 'methodical solipsism' is required if such a context of intentionality is to be understood. The experienced meanings express past intersubjective practices and the knowledge developed within it. An understanding based on the participation in the common world determines the perceptual situation. In consequence Husserl's idea of identifying the bare experience data becomes very questionable in this context.
Keywords
Contributors
author
  • J. Duraj, c/o Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Szmarzewskiego 89c, 60-568 Poznan, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
08PLAAAA03827663
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.069ba262-7dae-32da-a2f1-d507a4c2ce01
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