Actions as a Context for Realization of Meaning

• Authors: Duraj J.
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The article shows how 'early' Heidegger approached the problem of intentionality. It begins with a reconstruction of Husserlian concept of intentionality understood as a perceptive act in which the object of experience is first constituted. The author shows subsequently that the Heideggerian understanding of intentionality does not apply to objects of perception but to meaning which can be 'grasped' in the practical attitude only. This attitude determines the pre-theoretical context of intentionality. In consequence, an overcoming of Husserl's 'methodical solipsism' is required if such a context of intentionality is to be understood. The experienced meanings express past intersubjective practices and the knowledge developed within it. An understanding based on the participation in the common world determines the perceptual situation. In consequence Husserl's idea of identifying the bare experience data becomes very questionable in this context.

Keywords

EN

HEIDEGGER M.; HUSSERL; INTENTIONALITY

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Nauk
• Journal: Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
• Year: 2007
• Volume: 16
• Issue: 1(61)
• Pages: 281-290
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Duraj J.

• J. Duraj, c/o Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Szmarzewskiego 89c, 60-568 Poznan, Poland

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

08PLAAAA03827663