PL EN


Journal
2009 | 19 | 1 | 19-27
Article title

PRAGMATISM, EXPERIENCE, AND THE GIVEN

Authors
Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
The doctrine of the Given is that subjects have direct non-inferential awareness of content of their experiences and apprehensions, and that some of a subject's beliefs are justified on the basis of that subject's awareness of her experiences and apprehensions. Pragmatist criticisms of the Given as a myth are shown here not only to be inadequate but to presuppose the Given. A model for a pragmatist account of the Given is then provided in terms of refinements of Dewey's theory of experience. The doctrine of the Given is implicated in the functions of inquiry insofar as one must take it that experience is a source of justification.
Contributors
author
  • Scott Aikin, WKU Glasgow Regional Center, 500 Hilltopper Way, Glasgow, KY 42141-7966, USA
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
10SKAAAA075915
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.0779f150-75c6-3def-80bf-a41cf980c282
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.