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2016 | 64 | 5 | 691-704

Article title

Od skepticizmu k objektívnemu poznaniu

Authors

Content

Title variants

EN
From Scepticism to Objective Knowledge

Languages of publication

SK

Abstracts

The critical arguments of scepticism lead to the conclusion that no proposition can be justified as true. The attempts to define knowledge as justified true belief therefore fail, even within externalism. If we attribute knowledge to someone else, we can never justifiably know that we have done it correctly. Attributing knowledge is a hypothetical activity. Moreover, knowledge itself is hypothetical as well. There are no justifiably identifiable good reasons telling us that an investigated proposition is true. Scepticism thus leads an optimist, who holds that knowledge exists, to objectivism, i.e. to the view that knowledge is objective because its truth can be reduced neither to good reasons nor to the beliefs of investigators. Keywords: scepticism, objective knowledge, internalism, externalism, objectivism

Year

Volume

64

Issue

5

Pages

691-704

Physical description

Document type

ARTICLE

Contributors

  • Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.0ab95146-088d-499d-a8d5-2212cdde3163
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