The essay tries to give a Husserlian interpretation of the existential analysis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'. Though in the period of 'Being and Time' there was already an extreme distance between the phenomenological method of Heidegger's and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, on closer examination Heidegger's phenomenology of that time turns out to be in a certain way compatible with Husserl's methodology. If we interpret the phenomenological results of 'Being and Time' in the Husserlian terminology of intentionality then the methodology of existential analysis is proved to be a macro-phenomenology: the phenomenology of human life-story's horizon as a whole in contrast to the husserlian micro-phenomenology of the life of consciousness. On a thematic level the sharpest difference of the transcendental phenomenology and existential analysis seems to be the concept of self. Heidegger often criticizes the traditional phenomenal-phenomenological view of the self-identical, 'empty' I-pole, saying that that view interprets the self like something 'present-at-hand' (vorhanden). This paper deals mostly with this charge. At the 'Being and Time' to give a phenomenon the interpretation of presence-at-the-hand (Vorhandensein) means to uproot this phenomenon from its real context in the life-world. The author tried to show on one hand that we can interconnect the Husserlian concept of transcendental ego with the Heideggerian here-being through the concept of the here-being's 'ever-mineness' (Jemeinigkeit), on the other hand that the context of being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein) is approachable in the same manner or a Husserlian interpretation.