In recent decades, special attention has been devoted, within the framework of the constitutional conception of the separation of powers, to the systemic independence of judicial power. The main goal is to minimise the organisational and personal influence of executive power, that is, cabinets and ministries of justice. Immediately after World War II, the constitutional solution used by the French and Italians introduced the concept of “supreme judicial councils” as special central authorities of an administrative type. This is an institution that is essentially independent of executive power, generally made up of judges or other justice officials. The function of these institutions, which are in place in over fifteen constitutional democracies in Europe, especially comes into play during decision-making on the professional/personal matters of judicial candidates, during their training for their role and likewise when choosing them. In this sense, these “supreme judicial councils” decide on the selection criteria for judges essentially defined in every constitutional system via applicable laws. However, the councils have a fundamental role in the implementation of these criteria, as well as in judge selection itself. The constitutional systems in which these councils operate have also succeeded in minimising the influence of calculated personal politics by the executive power in relation to court functionaries, which is of fundamental importance above all for decision-making on judges’ progression to the higher courts, but is also important for the actual appointment of judges for governing positions at every level of the court system. There is also a need to monitor the independence and essential autonomy of the court system when handling punitive and disciplinary matters relating to judges.