Heidegger, zlo a zodpovednosť človeka

• Authors: Beatrix Susanne Lepis

Title variants

EN

Heidegger, evil and human responsibility

• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

EN

Heidegger approaches the problem of evil in an unusual way. He disregards its moral connotations, intending to analyze it as a purely ontological problem intertwined with the concept of nothingness and the forgetfulness of being. A problem with this approach that is frequently commented upon is that it omits the aspect of human responsibility, as it portrays humans merely as passive recipients of fate. The aim of this study is to show that in his 1936 Schelling-Lecture Heidegger approaches the problem of evil in a more complex manner: on the one hand, he portrays evil as a necessary part of being; on the other hand, he leaves a certain space for decision making. This dimension, mostly overlooked in the literature, is highlighted in the study by means of three main steps: 1) analyzing the relevant paragraphs of Heidegger’s Schelling-Lecture; 2) identifying the inconsistencies that emerge in these paragraphs; and 3) offering a coherent interpretation of evil as a real possibility of human freedom.

Keywords

EN

Martin Heidegger; evil; responsibility; flight; fallenness; inauthenticity; resoluteness

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2022
• Volume: 70
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 267-283
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Beatrix Susanne Lepis

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic