PL EN


2008 | 17 | 2(66) | 211-218
Article title

Why Don't I Like Possible Worlds

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
The author argues that possible worlds semantics is counterintuitive and fails to achieve its goals. The definition of the meaning of a sentence as the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true is criticized as inadequate; the semantics of modal expressions is claimed uninformative. Truth-conditions of counterfactuals on one hand, and definitions of law-like expressions (or statements expressing causal connection) on the other hand, are regarded as circular. A further development of indexical semantics - a more fine-grained one, involving interdisciplinary research into the relations among the indices - is advocated as an alternative.
Keywords
Contributors
  • M. Talasiewicz, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
09PLAAAA064011
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.15bc3faa-a609-3cfc-b637-4b7920d3a624
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