The article is not a historical piece, but rather aims to contribute to contemporary discussion of its theme. The author draws freely on, above all, Thomist elements and he attempts, on their basis, to formulate a starting point for a theory of mind that would be acceptable today. For this reason documentary support in the form of citations of the historical sources is kept to a minimum. In order for the question to meet the interests of the contemporary reader appeal is made to several contemporary analytically-orientated authors (mainly T. Nagel and J. R. Searle), who in their treatment of certain points of detail, defend positions similar to the author’s own. The account is divided into three parts. In the first (1), the author discusses consciousness in general, in the second (2) he concerns himself with simple (that is, without focusing on the object) conscious states, in the third part (3) he discusses states focusing on an object, that is, on intentional states. This part is further divided into two sub-sections: in the first (3.1) the author points to the materiality of sensory intention, in the second (3.2) the author attempts to show that the intentional objects of reason (which the author takes to be abstract objects) by their very immateriality point to the immateriality of intentions themselves (that is, the corresponding cognitive act), as well as the immateriality of their bearer. In this way the bases for further reflections on the human soul are clarified, although the author does not concern himself with these further reflections in this article.