PL EN


2009 | 56 | 6 | 563-571
Article title

NEGATIVE SELECTION AND MORAL RISK IN POLITICS. AN OUTLINE OF THE USEFULNESS TO POLITICAL SCIENCE OF THE ECONOMIC CONCEPT OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY (Hungarian title - below)

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
HU
Abstracts
EN
(Title in Hungarian - 'Kontraszelekcio es erkolcsi kockazat a politikaban. Vazlat az informacios aszimmetria kozgazdasagtani fogalmainak politikatudomanyi alkalmazhatosagarol'). The paper argues in favour of employing in political science the economic concept of information asymmetry, seeking to show that the mechanisms of information asymmetry among the players on the political market may have negative effects on the operation of a democratic political system as information asymmetry among economic actors - according to arguments of Nobel prize-winning economists - has on the efficiency of market competition. The paper sheds new light on the phenomenon of negative political selection (known since Plato's time), and goes on to deal in detail with the appearance of moral risk and client/agent relations in politics. The author touches also on the appearance in politics of mechanisms - signals and filters - that economists suggest for reducing information asymmetry.
Year
Volume
56
Issue
6
Pages
563-571
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
author
  • Zoltan Szanto, no address given, contact the journal editor
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
10HUAAAA07888
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.18a88b8b-5ade-3e50-a524-981a55a3ada4
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