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2005 | 1 | 159-174
Article title

ABSOLUTISM AND PLURALISM

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Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
Alethic absolutism is a thesis that propositions can not be more or less true, that they are true or false for ever (if true at all) and that their truth is independent on any circumstances of their assertion. In negative version, easier to defend, alethic absolutism claims the very same proposition can not be both true and false relative to circumstances of its assertion. Simple alethic pluralism is a thesis that we have many concepts of truth. It is a very good way to dissolve the controversy between alethic relativism and absolutism. Many philosophical concepts of truth are the best reason for such pluralism. If concept is meaning of a name, we have many concepts of truth because the name 'truth' was understood in many ways. The variety of meanings however can be superficial. Under it we can find one idea of truth expressed in correspondence truism or schema (T). The content of the truism is too poor to be content of anyone concept of truth, so it usually is connected with some picture of the world (ontology) and we have so many concepts of truth as many pictures of the world. The authoress proposes the hierarchical pluralism with privileged classic (or correspondence in weak sense) concept of truth as absolute property.
Year
Issue
1
Pages
159-174
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • R. Zieminska, Uniwersytet Szczecinski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowska 71, 71-017 Szczecin, Poland
References
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CEJSH db identifier
07PLAAAA03326854
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.1aca154e-43c6-3bdf-aa5c-e2d4184d7e98
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