PL EN


Journal
2006 | 14 | 3(55) | 49-56
Article title

PERSONAL IDENTITY THROUGH TIME : SOME CONSEQUENCES OF ESSENTIALISM

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
The paper is an attempt to formulate some consequences of the metaphysical doctrine of mereological essentialism and the assumption that persons persisting through time remain identical in the strict and philosophical sense (Chisholm, following Butler and Reid). Those consequences are substantiality, non-constitutivity, constantiality, anti-identism (non-bodility), and simplicity of persons. The author tries to show that although the above stance has a great theoretical appeal, it leads to many further difficulties, which remain without reasonable answers.
Journal
Year
Volume
14
Issue
Pages
49-56
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
author
  • M. Grygianiec, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydzial Filozofii i Socjologii, Zaklad Filozofii Nauki, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
07PLAAAA01853948
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.1acabe0e-d190-355a-bbcc-f19f4118dcd1
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