The author discusses the course of negotiations between Augustus II and Sweden in 1719-1720, starting with the considerable divergence of opinions held by historians concerning the date and form of the convention which ended the war between the Commonwealth-Saxony and Sweden; she also wonders whether the pact ever took place. Subsequently, the article goes on to analyse consecutive projects devised in Dresden, Stockholm and Warsaw, indicating the main discrepancies. Augustus II demanded the unconditional recognition of his power in the Commonwealth (without any rights or titles granted to Stanislaw Leszczynski) and territorial claims in the Reich. The Swedish side called for the renouncement of all claims, a confirmation of the treaty of Oliwa, the recognition of the royal title of Stanislaw Leszczynski and grants of means of subsistence (the restoration of estates of a pension), and the membership of the Commonwealth in an anti-Russian coalition. Another essential factor was the protest expressed by the Polish lords who feared that a separatist treaty with Sweden would pose the threat of an outbreak of a war against Russia; they placed greater hope in ending the war at the side of Peter I, relying on him to realise the promise of transferring to the Commonwealth Samogitia captured from Sweden. The author demonstrates that even the project of signing a preliminary treaty with Sweden by Augustus II as the elector of Saxony remained unaccepted by the Polish lords. The problem of negotiations was delayed until the Seym convention of autumn of 1720 and the congress of Brunswick. Nonetheless, the divergencies of the stands represented by the interested parties had not been eliminated. The Seym convention proved futile, and the congress of Brunswick never took place. As a result, both in 1719 and 1720 no formal pact was signed between Augustus II and Sweden. The ineffectual nature of the negotiations with Augustus II indubitably became for Sweden one of the impulses for signing a peace with Russia in Nystadt.