PL EN


2008 | 17 | 3(67) | 89-106
Article title

Freedom of the Will and Determinism of Nature in Kant's Transcendentalizm

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
This article is an attempt to reconstruct Kant's position with respect to the possibility of freedom conceived as undetermined causality that operates in the empirical world. This proposal meets with an obvious obstacle. It is unclear how the universal causality of the empirical world (or the phenomenal world) is to be reconciled with an initiation of new causal chains by free will. In the first part of the article the author presents Kant's views and highlights Kant's belief that the practical reason requires an establishment of transcendental freedom. In the second part of the article several theoretical difficulties arising from these assumptions are discussed.
Contributors
author
  • R. Philipp, Akademia Wychowania Fizycznego w Krakowie, Zaklad Filozofii, al. Jana Pawla II 78, 31-571 Krak√≥w, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
09PLAAAA064018
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.25a5f6ef-f7bf-3fcf-8575-02b8989c7027
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