PL EN


2007 | 14 | 1 | 53-71
Article title

RELATIVISM AND ALETHIC FUNCTIONALISM

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
The essay is an attempt to offer a version of the conceptual relativism that escapes Donald Davidson's (widely thought) decisive criticisms of the notion of 'conceptual scheme'. Two variants of relativism are distinguished, a weaker and a stronger one. The concrete proposal involves accepting a version of 'alethic' pluralism. After discussing 'alethic' pluralism in general, and after exploring both strong and weak versions of it, a suitable version is presented: 'alethic' functionalism. The final part offers an illustration of how embracing 'alethic' functionalism may help the relativist.
Contributors
  • D. Zeman, Central European University, 9 Nador ut., H-1051, Budapest, Hungary
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
07SKAAAA02244704
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.25ca7e49-3ff1-3d79-acb5-921012ad499f
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.