Corporeality as a Condition of Intersubjectivity in Jan Patočka’s Thought
According to Jan Patočka, phenomenology considers the human body as phenomenon. In Body, Community, Language and World Patočka concentrates on the body as a living and subjective entity, which represents the condition of our existence in the world, i.e. also the condition of apparition. As a consequence, the body itself is the condition of its own appearance. If this conclusion is not absurd, than in what sense? In the two cases, are we dealing with the same body or do we necessarily speak about two different entities? How are these entities characterized and how do they eventually differ? And if we speak about the same body, how is this body to be taken into account? May the phenomenological method be applied on an entity which seems to condition the existence of phenomena? Is it not rather a blind spot from which the phenomena arise and in which they disappear? And last but not least, what are the consequences of Patočka’s conception of corporeality in the realm on interpersonal relationships and what possibilities of understanding oneself as well as the other do they open?
Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic
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