The Unfading Significance of Popper's Principle of Critical Rationalism
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The author argues that the epistemic significance of the principle of critical realism is far too great to be limited either to a certain phase in the development of logical positivism or to the post-Popperian line of methodology of natural sciences marked by such names as Thomas C. Kuhn, Imre Lakatos or Paul Feyerabend. He emphasizes the importance of the 'anti-positivistic turn' heralded by Popper's double scepticism with respect to the claims that natural sciences can be purged of metaphysics and that induction can somehow be vindicated. Having presented his assessment of Popper's position the author focuses on the 'reflector' theory of knowledge and emphasises the 'Socratic dimension' of the principle of rational criticism, stressing on both occasions that Popper's solutions have not lost their validity.
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