LOGICISM AND PARADOX II.

• Authors: Kolman V.
• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

This is a sequel to my article devoted to the development of Fregean logicism. The first part dealt with its 'rise and fall', i. e. its initial success in analyzing the concept of number and its subsequent fall at Russell's antinomy. In the course of the previous article we did not (have to) leave the area of the classical Fregean research. On the contrary, Russell's paradox and its analysis bring us now to the second part of the whole story - the (alleged) resurrection of the logistic idea in the works of Crispin Wright and George Boolos. We find ourselves in the middle of a neo-Fregean - structuralistic - approach based on the techniques of modern model-theoretical logic and (meta)mathematics. We do not want to criticize it yet, but only present some of the most important results such as the consistency of Hume's Principle or categoricity of Frege's (and Peano's) second-order arithmetic.

Keywords

EN

BOOLOS; FREGEAN LOGICISM; HUME'S PRINCIPLE; RUSSEL'S PARADOX; WRIGHT

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2005
• Volume: 12
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 121-140
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Kolman V.

• V. Kolman, Katedra logiky, Filozofické fakulty Karlovy Univerzity, Celetná 20, 116 42 Praha 1, Czech Republic

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

06SKAAAA00882105