PL EN


2010 | 32 | 1 | 37-57
Article title

Říká logicismus něco, co se říkat nemá?

Authors
Content
Title variants
EN
DOES LOGICISM SAY SOMETHING THAT SHOULD NOT BE SAID?
Languages of publication
CS
Abstracts
EN
The objective of this paper is to analyze the broader significance of Frege's logicist project against the background of Wittgenstein's philosophy from both Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. The article draws on two basic observations, namely (1) that Frege's project aims at saying something that was only implicit in everyday arithmetical practice, as the so-called recursion theorem demonstrates, and (2) that the explicitness involved in logicism does not concern the arithmetical operations themselves, but rather the way they are defined. It thus represents the attempt to make explicit not the (arithmetical) rules alone, but rather the rules governing their following, i.e. rules of second-order type. I elaborate on these remarks with short references to Brandom's refinement of Frege's expressivist and Wittgenstein's pragmatist project.
Year
Volume
32
Issue
1
Pages
37-57
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • Vojtech Kolman, Filosoficka fakulta, Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Nam. J. Palacha 2, 116 38 Praha 1, Czech Republic
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
11CZAAAA094921
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.28a134be-7a63-38ce-a713-3924e1e9489b
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.