In his 1913/1916 publication entitled 'Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values', Max Scheler develops the issue of person and value. In 'Ordo amoris' (1916) he presents the missing link in the relation between person and value, and in 'Ressentiment' (1912) he considers the relation in its inverted form. These three works constitute a whole that stresses the functional existence of values and its constitutive role for human identity in its individual and social dimensions. In 'Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity' (1989), Charles Taylor, going back to the sources of the self, undertakes Scheler's concept of the constitution of identity by values in its individual and social dimensions, giving them new life in the form of values as qualitative differences and their best account articulation. Taylor completes his analysis of values as qualitative differences with hermeneutical encouragement for seeking their sources in a quite theoretical way. Scheler sees the vehicle of values and moral growth in exemplars of the person, which is an another way of thinking about value - not in the terms of an 'eidos', but in the terms of real persons and their non-formal ethics. This paper considers the place of values in this non-formal method.