Účelové příčiny a kauzální působení z budoucnosti

• Authors: Palkoska, Jan

Title variants

EN

Final causes and causal influences from the future

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

My aim is to assess an argument against final causation being an irreducible metaphysical category. The argument in question is based upon the supposition that for anything to count as a cause, it must exist at the very moment of executing its causal action, which requirement can supposedly never be met by anything rightly pretending to be called a final cause. I argue that this argument is far from conclusive as there seem to be ways of blocking it - namely through adopting either a version of the eternalist ontology of temporal dimensions, or else a version of the possibilist ontology, each combined with either a version of the "Humean" approach to analysis of causal relations, or else with a version of the realist approach to causation.

Keywords

EN

causation; purpose; teleology; eternalism; possibilism; epistemology; event; fact

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2014
• Volume: 62
• Issue: 5
• Pages: 693-709
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Palkoska, Jan

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic