PL EN


2009 | 56 | 10 | 851-865
Article title

A SIMPLE MODEL OF TAX-FAVOURED RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS (Az onkentes nyugdijrendszer egy egyszeru modellje)

Title variants
Languages of publication
HU
Abstracts
EN
To save myopic workers against themselves, the government introduces a mandatory system, but to help savers, it adds tax-favoured retirement accounts. Using a very simple model where benefits are proportional to contributions, the author compares three extreme systems: (i) the pure mandatory system, (ii) the asymmetric system, where only savers participate in the voluntary system, (iii) and the symmetric system, where both types participate proportionally to their wages. The symmetric voluntary system is welfare-superior to the asymmetric one, and to the pure mandatory system, which in turn are equivalent to each other.
Year
Volume
56
Issue
10
Pages
851-865
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • Andras Simonovits, no address given, contact the journal editor
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
10HUAAAA078821
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.2f32e059-1abb-3c3a-88be-c4c0f5173059
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