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2009 | 56 | 10 | 851-865

Article title

A SIMPLE MODEL OF TAX-FAVOURED RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS (Az onkentes nyugdijrendszer egy egyszeru modellje)

Title variants

Languages of publication

HU

Abstracts

EN
To save myopic workers against themselves, the government introduces a mandatory system, but to help savers, it adds tax-favoured retirement accounts. Using a very simple model where benefits are proportional to contributions, the author compares three extreme systems: (i) the pure mandatory system, (ii) the asymmetric system, where only savers participate in the voluntary system, (iii) and the symmetric system, where both types participate proportionally to their wages. The symmetric voluntary system is welfare-superior to the asymmetric one, and to the pure mandatory system, which in turn are equivalent to each other.

Year

Volume

56

Issue

10

Pages

851-865

Physical description

Document type

ARTICLE

Contributors

  • Andras Simonovits, no address given, contact the journal editor

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier
10HUAAAA078821

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.2f32e059-1abb-3c3a-88be-c4c0f5173059
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