In the paper the role of causal relations in science is analyzed. On the basis of philosophical positions on determinism it is shown that the discussion between teleological and deterministic views in science is contemporarily at least equally essential as at the beginning of modern philosophy, though the latter is more complex than the former one. A description in categories of choices and goals is necessary for an insight into intentional subject activity. It is also required by phenomena of establishing the so-called attractors discovered in natural sciences. However, independently of the essence of the contemporary dispute on fatalism the human tendency to grasp the world by causal relations is, according to the authors, conditioned biologically.
J. Werszowiec Plazowski, Uniwersytet Jagiellonski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland
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