PL EN


2008 | 36 | 2 | 5-14
Article title

INGARDEN'S REALISM

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
In his attempt to analyze the problem of realism, Ingarden started from the Husserlian distinction between the world and 'pure consciousness'. Nevertheless, he rejected all the ontological - or rather metaphysical - features attributed to consciousness by Husserl, while at the same time he was convinced of the indubitability of our knowledge of the basic characteristics of it as a sort of being existent inside the human person. If he had resigned from this epistemological feature of a privileged access, he would have had to grant that we do not need to seek a proof of the existence of the world at all. Other ways in which Ingarden tried to elucidate the problem of being - in the first place the problem of human nature - led him to the sphere of free persons. Understanding our knowledge of this sphere demands an understanding of the human senses in a dynamic and holistic way and the acceptance of a personal model of the world as the basis of our knowledge. The 'primary data' of our experience are, in fact, human persons; they are the paradigm of independent being and full realism means accepting them as similar to us, as free creatures.
Keywords
Year
Volume
36
Issue
2
Pages
5-14
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
author
  • A. Poltawski, 'Kwartalnik Filozoficzny', Uniwersytet Jagiellonski, Instytut Filozofii, ul.Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
08PLAAAA05169810
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.2fce915f-2f2b-307b-aea7-e6268584d561
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