The paper tries to analyze critically what is usually taken for granted - the causal relation between empirical knowledge about external world and the world which is (supposedly) known. The aim is neither to propose a new definition of knowledge nor to restate an old one but rather to take a closer look at the claim that knowledge is a true belief caused in a proper way by facts, events, etc. of the external world. This claim is a core of the epistemological approach usually labelled as a 'causal theory of knowledge', but there are many causal theories distinct from each other. The paper therefore sketches the causal components of D. Davidson's epistemology and the roles they play in the process of cognizing, first. Then it exposes more details of Davidson's approach and pushes some of them further critically.
Milos Taliga, Katedra filozofie, FHV, Univerzita Mateja Bela, Tajovskeho 40, 974 01 Banska Bystrica, Slovak Republic
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