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Abstracts
Relying on two works - 'Matter and Memory' and a study on dreams - the author traces implications of Bergson's metaphysical assumptions. They seem to support not only Bergson's epistemological tenets but also his neurobiological hypotheses. The entire structure of Bergson's philosophy is reviewed in this process - the conception of duration, critique of the spatial projection of mental imagery, the theory of surface and deep ego. Bergson's assumptions combine to make traditional epistemological debates on the character of mental images obsolete. They put in new light mechanisms of remembering, the difference between perception and recollection, the distinction between habitual memory and purposeful recollecting. In the end a new reading of Bergson's metaphysical assumptions is offered, in which the concept of unconsciousness plays a great role and the anti-reductionist stance seems to be vindicated. The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Barbara Skarga and her book 'Czas i trwanie' [Time and duration].
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Pages
61-75
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
author
- P. Herbich, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland
References
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Publication order reference
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CEJSH db identifier
04PLAAAA000111
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.33a6c10b-8a54-357a-82f2-b42bcb5adcc3