Primacy of practical reason is an important tenet of Kant's philosophy. The author shows where this tenet is located in the argument structure of the second 'Critique'. By going into details of that work, the author tries to explain why Kant has not chosen to coordinate the practical and the theoretical use of reason. He also tries to understand the hierarchy imposed by Kant encompassing the practical and the theoretical reason. His conclusion is that the practical reason can offer a better and broader framework for the theoretical reason, than the latter could offer to the former. In this context it becomes clear why Kant believed that man is the ultimate source of morality.
J.Kloc-Konkolowicz, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland
Publication order reference
CEJSH db identifier