G.W. LEIBNIZ AND S. CLARKE ON VOLUNTARISM (Woluntaryzm w ujeciu Gottfrieda Wilhelma Leibniza i Samuela Clarke'a)
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The article concerns the metaphysical problem of divine will as it is discussed in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. Its essence can be expressed in the following question: in which way the determinism developed by Leibniz goes along with his doctrine of freedom in action and deciding? Leibniz is convinced that there is no contradiction between these two theses. Clarke is strongly opposed to that view. He is the protagonist of indeterminism. The article is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the divine will in relation to the principle of the sufficient reason. The second part points to some difficulties related to Leibniz's view on determinism.
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