PL EN


Journal
2008 | 16 | 3-4(63-64) | 177-190
Article title

IN THE DEFENCE OF INTERNALISM. SEARLE VS. PUTNAM (W obronie internalizmu. Searle vs. Putnam)

Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
The article concerns the problem of reference in general, and the controversy internalism - externalism in particular. The author presents and discusses John R. Searle's criticism of Hilary Putnam's famous arguments for causal theory of reference: the elms-beech example and the Twin Earth example. Instead of external theory of reference Searle proposes his own intentional theory of reference. According to that theory the reference of a name is determined by intentional content of that name. The name is used properly only when used to indicate an object contained in its intentional content. On the ground of intentional theory of reference this feature of names is called casual self-referentiality. Searle underlines that intentional content is not necessarily verbal. In fact he allows non-conceptual, for example perceptual content. The problem of direct reference is closely connected to the question of 'de dicto' and 'de re' beliefs. In conclusion some drawbacks of Searle's theory are shown. Namely allowing object a name refers to to be a part of the intentional content of the name Searle seems to be very close external theory of reference he is fighting against.
Journal
Year
Volume
16
Issue
Pages
177-190
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • Krzysztof Gajewski, Instytut Badan Literackich PAN, ul.Nowy Swiat 72, 00-330 Warszawa, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
09PLAAAA060311
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.379d6c11-0d8a-34b3-91bb-a5fa21b25fc5
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