PL EN


2011 | 66 | 2 | 141-153
Article title

THE CONTROVERSY OVER RES IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE MYSTERIES OF ONTOLOGICAL NEUTRALITY

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
Clarification of the terms 'realism' and 'antirealism' has always been a challenging task for philosophers of science, epistemologists, and metaphysicians. The first part of the paper offers a certain classification and critical exposition of realisms in philosophy of science. Next, the author takes up the issue of finding a middle or natural ground between realism and antirealism. Arthur Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude is generally considered as a highly interesting and promising attempt at combining the strengths of the two sides of the debate in philosophy of science while avoiding their excessive 'philosophical' claims. The author argues that while reconciliatory approaches are definitely welcome in this matter, Fine's project fails because of its inability to properly handle and carry certain significant and perhaps even indispensable features of realism and antirealism into the new position. Another indication of NOA's failure is Fine's notable misrepresentation of the main theses of the two camps that he strives to bring together. The resultant picture of NOA leaves a great deal to be desired because of Fine's Procrustean treatment and the inadequate ontological account emerging out of it.
Keywords
Year
Volume
66
Issue
2
Pages
141-153
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • Murat Bac, Assoc. Prof., Bogazi├ži University, Department of Philosophy, Guney Kampus, TB-360, Bebek, Istanbul, Turkey
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
11SKAAAA095711
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.38e29794-2cb9-33ae-aba7-40910c8c8d67
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.