PL EN


Journal
2010 | 1(28) | 29-66
Article title

THE NORMATIVITY OF LAW. OUTLINE OF A THEORY (Normatywnosc prawa. Szkic teorii)

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
This essay aims at providing a sketch of a new theory of law's normativity. The author begins by defining normativity as a feature of rules: rules are normative if they are objective reasons for action. Also, he argues that one can explain normativity only within a well-defined ontological framework. Next, he criticizes two general ontological conceptions: monism and dualism. He shows that both are incapable of providing a foundation for a theory of normativity. Further, He utilizes Popper's idea of three worlds and Wittgenstein's remarks concerning rule-following in order to outline an ontological background for the developed conception of normativity. He claims that rules (legal, moral, conventional etc.) are emergent entities which supervene on both mental states and regularities of social interactions. Against this backdrop he sketches a conception of normativity, which is antifoundational and relativistic. He claims that one should distinguish between three types of rules, and three kinds of normativity: rudimentary, intermediate and abstract. He further says that it is the intermediate rules that we 'live by'.
Journal
Year
Issue
Pages
29-66
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • Bartosz Brozek, Uniwersytet Jagiellonski, Katedra Teorii i Filozofii Prawa, ul. Wislna 2, 31-007 Kraków, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
10PLAAAA08742
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.3a85c8b7-3abe-30bd-b870-6f99317c0661
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.