CS
Naprostá většina zvolených se rekrutovala z řad technické inteligence mužského pohlaví a středního věku. Tato nová socialistická inteligence se postavila de facto do čela dělnického hnutí. Mezi radami pracujících a podnikovými organizacemi Komunistické strany Československa fungoval specifický konsenzus, ve kterém rady respektovaly politická stanoviska stranických orgánů a ty naopak přijímaly odborné kompetence rad. Nejlépe bylo možno tuto hybridní praxi sledovat na novém fenoménu veřejných konkurzů do manažerských funkcí. Autor ukazuje, jak se po okupaci v srpnu 1968 původně ekonomický projekt podnikových rad stále více transformoval do podoby hnutí s politickými reformními ambicemi. Neformálním centrem těchto aktivit se stal podnik Škoda Plzeň, který v lednu 1969 uspořádal celostátní sjezd samospráv. Rady pracujících se po pádu reformního vedení KSČ v dubnu 1969 stávaly stále více závislé na prostoru, který jim vůči nadřízeným instancím vytvářely stranické organizace podnikové úrovně. Ty se samy několik měsíců účinně bránily před politickými čistkami, přičemž využívaly zejména obav centrálního aparátu z masových protestů před výročím okupace v srpnu 1969. Po nuceném odchodu reformních funkcionářů na podnikové úrovni na podzim 1969 však již samosprávy ztratily veškeré politické zázemí a samy se rozpustily.
EN
Using results of his research in central, but mainly company archives, the author provides a comprehensive description of the phenomenon of self-governing bodies in Czechoslovak industrial enterprises during the Prague Spring. He concludes that elements of self-governing socialism were implemented in the Czechoslovak industry by a June 1968 resolution of the government. They were not a result of any emancipation movement, but originated from an expert economic discourse as a spin-off product of economic reforms. The self-governments were supposed to fulfil the role of collective entrepreneurial bodies with an autonomy toward the central bureaucratic apparatus. The idea of self-governing bodies was naturally supported by a significant majority of industrial employees, as it enabled a substantial reduction of the bureaucratic apparatus and a suppression of clientelism through public auditions. Since the summer of 1968, elections of members of workers’ councils (rady pracujících) were taking place in different enterprises, which were, at that time, of an unprecedentedly democratic nature. Most of the elected members were male, of medium age, and came from ranks of technical intelligentsia. The new socialist intelligentsia de facto took the lead of the workers’ movement.
EN
There was a specific consensus existing between enterprise-level cells of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the workers’ councils, with the latter respecting political views of the party organs and the former, on the other hand, accepting professional competencies of the councils. The best example on which the hybrid practice could be followed was a new phenomenon of public auditions for managerial positions. The author shows how the initially economic project of the enterprise councils was increasingly transforming itself into a movement with political ambitions since the August 1968 occupation. The informal centre of these activities was Škoda Plzeň, which organized a nationwide congress of self-governing bodies in January 1969. After the fall of the reform-oriented leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in April 1969, the workers’ councils were becoming increasingly dependent on the leeway vis-á-vis superiors, which company-level party organizations created for them. The latter were effectively resisting political purges for a few months; in this respect, they were making use, in particulars, of worries of the central apparatus of mass protests before the anniversary of the occupation in August 1969. However, after the forced resignation of company-level reformists in the autumn of 1969, the self-governing bodies lost all political support and dissolved themselves.