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2009 | 16 | 4 | 477-492
Article title

: STRAWSON ON THE NOTION OF THE FIRST PERSON

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
The paper is an attempt to understanding Strawson's notion of the first person in the context of his general theory of a person. More specifically it will look into the idea that the concept of a person is 'primitive', and see how Strawson's idea of primitiveness of the concept of a person can be extended to his notion of the first person. One way of cashing out the notion of primitiveness in the context of the first person is in terms of the way the pronoun 'I' functions in self ascription, like 'I am feeling terrible'. As Strawson himself points out, 'use of 'I' is guaranteed against two kinds of failure to which the uses of some other definite referring expressions are sometimes exposed: it is guaranteed against lack of reference, and it is guaranteed against mistaken or incorrect reference' (1994, 215). Does this way of understanding the primitiveness of the first person work? If it does, what kind of notion of the first person and authoritative self-knowledge may be derived from it? Another related issue that will be dealt with in the paper is how one can construe the relationship between the first person and the world on the one hand and the first person and 'the other' on the other hand within the Strawsonian framework.
Contributors
  • Manidipa Sen, Centre for Philosophy, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi-110067, The Republic of India; www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/organon
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
10SKAAAA074810
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.3c11e5a1-57de-39ee-a409-91944c6a4b04
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