PL EN


Journal
2011 | 19 | 2(74) | 63-83
Article title

THE MECHANISMS OF FALLING DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE (Mechanizmy 'staczania sie' po równi pochylej)

Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
The empirical slippery slope arguments are arguments of the following form: if we take a first step A, as a result of a sequence of events, step N will necessarily or very likely follow; N is clearly not acceptable; therefore we must not take step A. Such arguments are often used in the discussions concerning abortion, assisted suicide, human gene therapy, free speech, decriminalizing marijuana, gun control and other ethical or social issues. In this article, I am trying to argue that although slippery slope arguments are not deductive, they need not to be considered as fallacies. There are some mechanisms that make the realization of the scenarios sketched in the slippery slope arguments much more probable than one could think. I analyze three different examples of such mechanisms. The first one originates in the psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. The second is connected with the use of precedents. The third mechanism depends on so-called multi-peaked preferences which some people might have when they make their decisions.
Journal
Year
Volume
19
Issue
Pages
63-83
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • Krzysztof Wieczorek, Uniwersytet Slaski, Wydzial Nauk Spolecznych, Instytut Filozofii, Zaklad Logiki i Metodologii, ul. Bankowa 11, 40-007 Katowice, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
11PLAAAA095132
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.3d1d6987-4944-32ab-a980-57eda8ab9c68
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