This paper raises the issue of the notion of rule-following in the late philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and its possible implications in the field of law. First part is focused on Wittgenstein's 'theory' of what does it mean to obey the rule, it sketches the manner he approaches this issue in Philosophical Investigations and it summes up the outcome - i.e. rule-following does not lie in the interpretation, but it is basicly the matter of the practice (customs, institutions). Second part deals with objections to application of Wittgenstein on the theory of law and it aspires to use Wittgenstein's rule-following as the new eyes (new point of view) on the problems of adherence to legal rules. It also offers a few practical examples of legal rule-following and it hopefully provokes the questions about nature and reasons of the process of obeying legal rules. Last section of the second part is dedicated to the discussion of the authorities in given field - mainly Prof. Morawetz and Prof. Patterson. However, the paper ends with conviction that even if Wittgenstein's 'theory' is not en bloc applicable on the legal theory, still, it is not fully unusable and it has some explanatory value.