Reduction and emergence

• Authors: Fazekas P.
• Languages of publication: HU

Abstracts

EN

The well-known critical analyses of the classical Nagelian model of reduction point at some problems related to the explanatory power of bridge laws. The functional model of reduction, proposed by Kim as an alternative, denies the necessity of bridge laws, and -using the functional model of explanation - tries to avoid them. This paper analyses the characteristics of both Nagelian and functional reduction, and shows that the implicit thesis of functional reduction stating that bridge laws are avoidable, is in fact untenable. By recognizing the inevitability of bridge laws, a new model of reduction can be formulated. The new model of reduction provides an appropriate framework to treat emergent phenomena - which were traditionally incompatible with reductive physicalism - together with the classical examples of reduction. This paper introduces the notion of emergent reduction, a new interpretation of emergent phenomena, which lifts emergence out of the standard examples of contemporary non-reductive physicalism. The corner-stone of the new interpretation of emergent phenomena is the recognition of the similarity between emergent laws and fundamental laws. The investigation of this similarity draws attention to the importance of scientific frame-theories.

Keywords

EN

BRIDGE-LAWS; EMERGENCE; MIND-BODY; ONTOLOGY; REDUCTIONISM

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Committee on Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Magyar Filozofiai Szemle (Hungarian Review of Philosophy)
• Year: 2004
• Volume: 48
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 445-470
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Fazekas P.

• P. Fazekas, no address given, contact the journal editor

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

06HUAAAA00872098