The paper focuses on the relation of the so-called 'Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL)' and 'Aristotelian Essentialism'. TIL is presented here as an antiessentialist system. The author analyses the reasons of TIL's anti-essentialism, and he sees the main reasons in the very conception of the possible worlds, which is preferred by TIL, as well as in the ontological status of the properties and secondarily in the relation between the individuals and properties, as TIL conceives it. He asserts that even within the frame of TIL it is possible to formulate a certain version of the Aristotelian Essentialism and he points out the intuitions that are connected with the concept of essence and preserved by the formulated conception, contrary to TIL and other systems of modern logic.
K. Sebela, for postal address contact the journal editor
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