PL EN


2009 | 16 | 3 | 317-327
Article title

GOLDIE'S PUZZLING OF TWO FEELINGS: 'BODILY FEELING' AND 'FEELING TOWARD'

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
Emotion theorists have divided into two camps in contemporary discussion. The one claims that emotions are reducible to bodily feelings; the other holds that emotions are reducible to belief, desire or evaluative judgement. In an effort to avoid such reduced view, Goldie suggests that emotions involve two kinds of feelings: bodily feelings and feeling towards. In spite of Goldie's efforts, the author argues that explaining our emotional disposition in terms of 'feeling toward' remains distinctly unsatisfactory. Furthermore, though sympathetic to his project, the author gives reasons for doubting that there are two such distinct kinds of feeling, one of which has only borrowed intentionality, while the other has intentionality intrinsically.
Contributors
  • Sunny Yang, Institute of Philosophy, Seoul National University, South Korea; www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/organon
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
09SKAAAA07043
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.455d8e08-c319-308b-aa39-f8b5d01d6905
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