2015 | 63 | 3, Special No: Sedmkrát z logiky a metodologie vědy | 143-152
O (vedeckých) inštrumentoch na pozadí Kvaszovho inštrumentálneho realizmu
On (scientiﬁc) instruments within Kvasz’s version of instrumental realism
Languages of publication
According to instrumental realism (Don Ihde, Instrumental Realism, 1991) science comes about by virtue of instruments and within experimental situ¬ations. This is the idea of the technological embodiment of science in experi¬mentation. In its broader sense, instrumental realism: (a) emphasizes dyna¬mically-developing scientiﬁc praxis, giving a central role to instruments; (b) oﬀers a critique of a purely propositional view of the character of analysis used in the philosophy of science; and (c) gives some degree of “reality-sta¬tus” to entities often taken (by the preceding philosophy of science) to be merely theoretical (Ihde, 98-114). However, one can ask what the nature of the instruments is? Do they constitute any speciﬁc kind of experience? In this paper I examine the problematic status of the instruments within the IR position developed by Ladislav Kvasz, and I go on to suggest how to defend the position that instruments are not only a part of scientiﬁc praxis, but also a key part of our everyday life and our ordinary language.
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