The article concerns the fundamental metaphysical problem of human freedom as it is discussed in Leibniz's philosophy. The essence of it can be expressed as follows: in what way the determinism developed by Leibniz goes along with his doctrine of human freedom in action? The article is divided into two parts. The first part contains analysis of Leibniz's theses encapsulating his determinism and those concerning his concept of freedom. The second part points to some major difficulties resulting from Leibniz's view. Leibniz starts with the conviction that there is no contradiction between the two following theses: 1) at least some human actions are performed freely (i.e. the agent might have done otherwise than in fact he did) ; and 2) each action has a reason which is known beforehand and this is the reason why the action is undertaken rather than not. This view was justified by Leibniz by means of (1) introducing divisions and distinctions between modalities, (2) by laying the stress on teleological determinism, and (3) by arguments in favour of the thesis that the world exists contingently. The analysis carried out in the second part demonstrates that Leibniz's view leads to some difficulties. Two of them are of great significance: a) the relationship between freedom and Inter-World Identity of the agent, and b) seemingly unavoidable link between freedom and indeterminism. Both these problems result from the fact that Leibniz's idea of freedom was based on his strong concept of individuality, and from universal analyticity of truth.
P. Gut, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, Wydzial Filozofii, al. Raclawickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland
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