In 1998 and 1999 the NATO had a limited strategic choice: to inform that the Kosovo conflict is not in its sphere of interests and is an internal problem of Yugoslavia, which could lead to the international CSCE and UN involvement, or to get involved in the conflict. It has picked the latter. The operation called 'Allied Force' lasted 78 days and has been a military blitz. According to the author, the fundamental question in that conflict however was not that who is right but that one what is the purpose of intervention? What are our interests, which solutions are the best? What are the potential gains and losses? In author's opinion the Kosovo conflict shows a gradual departing from the equal distance or balance of power to one-side support. His theses are comprised in three chapters: Shaken balance, War from a Sky, and Pyrrhic Victory. Among many often forgotten elements, which have influenced the NATO decisions, was the activity of Kosovians of Albanian descent, which dragged the West into the war in their cause. Author encourages the reader to draw conclusions from that conflict in order to avoid such situations in the future.
L. Warzecha, Instytut Studiow Politycznych PAN, ul. Polna 18/20, 00-625 Warszawa, Poland
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