The article consists of five parts. In the first part the author concentrates on the problem of realism in its philosophical context, on disputes from which it derives and it corresponds with. Afterwards, he analyzes and correct the canonical version of Putnam's No-miracle argument, viewed as the strongest argument in favour of scientific realism. In the next part, he is trying to confront the objections that can be raised against this type of argumentation. It will relate to an attempt to resolve the three questions, asked from three different perspectives: 1) An empiricist (The Vienna Circle) will ask if the success of the science needs an explanation 2) Next, a 'neutral' anti-realist or a critical realist will investigate: is the presented argument, logically coherent and historically adequate? 3) Finally, a constructionist (The sociology of knowledge / Postmodernism) will ask: is the success (understood approaching to the truth) of science is a fact, or the a (meta)fact? In the end, the author tries to explain why he did not succeed in giving unambiguous answer to those three questions.