PL EN


2005 | 2 | 25-38
Article title

MORALITY VERSUS PARTIALITY

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Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
Patriotism is not a viable option for the traditional universalistic moral systems, including Kantian rationalism and especially for consequentialism. The author follows Sosa in claiming that not all forms of consequentialism have to lack 'deontic components'. He follows up with a stronger claim, that not all systems, deontic or consequentialist, have to accept strong universalism that precludes non-instrumental special moral concerns. He presents the main alternatives: (a) Dancy's moral particularism; (b) Nagel's idea of partiality based on the non-reducible difference between personal and impersonal view points; (c) Scheffler's concern with non-voluntary special duties; (d) a broad range of philosophies, from Aristotle's to the ethics of care that use non-homogenous models. The author closes by claiming that the non-homogenous models result in viable moral theories. Such theories treat ethics not as a source of moral recommendations to the effect of what should happen in a given situation, but rather as rules of a largely competitive game that adjudicate two things: (1) what each agent should do in a given situation; (2) what constraints should be imposed on the manner in which that moral competition is taking place.
Keywords
Year
Issue
2
Pages
25-38
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • P. Boltuc, Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Springfield, Springfield IL 62703-5407, USA
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
07PLAAAA03326856
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.4c9a063d-c44e-39a5-b099-dafdf32e9006
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