There are two fundamental questions concerning the choice and presence of objects in various formal systems: (1) Where do these objects come from? (2) What do (can) we know about them? To answer these questions, the author introduces the notion of a protoontology as the pre-theoretic realm of (unspecified) entities from which the basic objects - individuals - of the formal system 'S' are postulated. The pragmatic aspects of such choices are investigated with regard to the first-order logic, both pure and applied. It is claimed that the postulated (chosen, constructed) objects enter the formal system 'S' with a package of the properties and relationships, the recognition of which depends on the interpretation and application of the available predicates of 'S'. If these properties and relationships are not made explicit, a possible clash may arise between them and the properties and relationships 'assigned' to the individuals of 'S' by the interpreted predicates of 'S'. As regards the relationship between logic and metaphysics, the author contends that logic can perhaps be viewed as the articulation of the fundamental features of the protoontological objects without which no discourse or theory would be possible. In this sense logic could also be viewed as a theory and method of the construction of a well-articulated metaphysical theory.