FINDING AS A NOTIONAL ATTITUDE I.

• Authors: Raclavsky J.
• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

Although finding does not seem to be logically and philosophically so much interesting as (intentional attitude of ) seeking, the present study gives exhaustive survey of logical analyses corresponding to (surprisingly many) kinds of finding (altogether with related issues). There are four basic groups of findings (all of them are expressed in natural languages in homonymous way): (I) finding by accidence; (II) finding after seeking which is typically relation between an agent and an intension; (III) finding after finding an instance of intension to which was an agent related by seeking; (IV) finding pejorativelly reported (agent is not really finding respective thing). Only type (II) can be considered as a notional attitude because it is a relation to an intension (a suitable candidate for ‘notion'); moreover, this relation is unique in the sense that agent is related just and only to one exact intension (thus its concept cannot be substituted by concept expressed by expression which is not coreferential in all possible worlds and time moments with the expression denoting original intension).

Keywords

EN

FINDING; FINDING PEJORATIVELY REPORTED; KINDS OF FINDING

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2005
• Volume: 12
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 141-167
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Raclavsky J.

• J. Raclavsky, no address given, contact the journal editor

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

06SKAAAA00882106