PL EN


2006 | 15 | 1(57) | 169-184
Article title

The Trouble with Reism

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
The paper presents Kotarbinski's reism in two versions: ontological (only things exist) and semantic (abstract expressions have sense only when they can be reduced to concrete expressions). It discusses the relation between reism and other, similar views. It shows the prospects for, and limitations of, the realisation of the semantic reism programme. Finally it responds to main objections to reism, and occasionally shows how these objections can be met in order to defend the reist position.
Contributors
author
  • A. Jedynak, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Instytut Filozofii, Zaklad Logiki, ul. Krakowskie Przedmiescie 3, 00-041 Warszawa, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
06PLAAAA01653616
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.51c9fbea-f66f-3d32-a57e-f0bcfe468da0
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