PL EN


2008 | 63 | 8 | 715-723
Article title

RELIABILISM, INTUITION, AND MATHEMATICAL KNOWLEDGE

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
It is alleged that the causal inertness of abstract objects and the causal conditions of certain naturalized epistemologies precludes the possibility of mathematical knowledge. This paper rejects this alleged incompatibility, while also maintaining that the objects of mathematical beliefs are abstract objects, by incorporating a naturalistically acceptable account of 'rational intuition'. On this view, rational intuition consists in a non-inferential belief-forming process where the entertaining of propositions or certain contemplations results in true beliefs. This view is free of any conditions incompatible with abstract objects, for the reason that it is not necessary that S stand in some causal relation to the entities in virtue of which p is true. Mathematical intuition is simply one kind of reliable process type, whose inputs are not abstract numbers, but rather, contemplations of abstract numbers.
Year
Volume
63
Issue
8
Pages
715-723
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • J. W. Mulnix, University Honors Program, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, 285 Old Westport Road, North Dartmouth, MA 02747, USA
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
08SKAAAA05356
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.528dfc50-0b90-3e35-a810-1a5122ca1907
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.