The article presents a critical analysis of Patocka's attempt to revise Husserlian phenomenology. The considerations are divided into four sections. In the first section, Patocka's critique is presented, the core of which consists in the accusation of Cartesianism. From this critique Patocka's concepts of intention, intuition (Anschauung), reflexion and the subject, resp. consciousness emerge. Within this conceptual framework the problem of perception arises, as a meeting of inside and outside, intention and intuition, all of which have been strictly separated by Patocka. The concept of immanence of the presence, which sets out to clarify the problem, is shown to only further exacerbate it. In consequence two irreconcilable motifs are distinguished, which have been named as Cartesianism in the proper sense and physicalism. Their intertwining within Patocka's thought results most firstly, in a disintegration of the concept of object into a double meaning, secondly, in a shift between the concept of consciousness and the concept of subject, and finally in the ambiguity of the argument of Cartesianism itself. In the following third section several of Patocka's concepts are analyzed in order to illustrate this mutual intertwining and its consequences: the problem of continuity of consciousness and the assertion that consciousness is an object, which further results in a misinterpretation of Husserlian concepts of immanence and overlapping (Deckung). On this basis the thesis is put forward that Patocka's conception is a contradictory one. Finally, three possibilities of how to proceed with this conception, if it is not to be abandoned, have been formulated: the first two of them have resulted in concepts which, according to the criteria given by us, must be considered non-phenomenological. The third possibility amounts to a cancellation of Patocka's revision, thus turning us back to Husserlian phenomenology.